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THE FEDERALISM-RIGHTS NEXUS:
EXPLAINING WHY SENATE DEMOCRATS
CAN TOLERATE REHNQUIST COURT
DECISION MAKING BUT NOT THE
REHNQUIST COURT
NEAL DEVINS*

INTRODUCTION

This essay attempts to explain the apparent disjunction
between Congress's disinterest in Rehnquist Court decisions
limiting federal power and recent calls by Senate Democrats to
use the judicial confirmation process as a way of checking the
Court for its "conservative judicial activism."1 Specifically, in
light of recent attacks on the Rehnquist Court, why is it that
Congress does not seem at all upset that the Rehnquist Court
has struck down twenty-nine statutes, including several highprofile measures, over the past seven years? 2 Lawmakers from

Goodrich Professor of Law and Professor of Government, College of
William and Mary. This essay builds upon remarks made at Conservative
Judicial Activism, a conference sponsored by the Byron R. White Center for the
Study of American Constitutional Law and The University of Colorado Law
Review, October 19-20, 2001. Thanks to Bob Nagel both for inviting me to the
Conference and for helping me think about the Supreme Court's role in shaping
constitutional discourse. Thanks also to conference participants for useful
feedback. Thanks, finally, to Mike Gerhardt, Lee Rawls and Keith Whittington
for useful conversations about this paper; to reference librarian extraordinaire,
Fred Dingledy; to my research assistants Erin O'Callaghan and Robin Mittler;
and to my William and Mary colleagues for comments at a works-in-progress
colloquium.
1. This essay will not provide a detailed examination of whether Senate
Democrats are correct in accusing the Rehnquist Court of being "conservative"
and "activist." My concern, instead, is the political saliency of Senate Democrats
using the "conservative judicial activism" label to limit President Bush's power to
make judicial appointments.
2. From April 1995 to June 2000, the Court declared unconstitutional
twenty-three federal statutes. Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Tipping Point, 32 NAT'L J.
1810, 1811 (2000). In its 2001 and 2002 terms, the Court invalidated all or part of
six federal statutes-four in 2001 and two in 2002. Linda Greenhouse, In Year of
Florida Vote, Supreme Court Also Did Much Other Work, N.Y. TIMES, July 2,
2001, at A12; Linda Greenhouse, Court Had Rehnquist Initials Intricately Carved
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both parties have largely ignored these decisions. And when
lawmakers have responded to the Court, they treat the Court's
decisions as final and dispositive-focusing, instead, on ways to
enact corrective legislation consistent with the Court's ruling.
At no point was there any suggestion of limiting the Court's
jurisdiction or engaging in other activities associated with
Court-curbing. Considering this backdrop, why are Democrats
on the Senate Judiciary Committee now leading the charge
against "conservative judicial activism"?3
In sorting out this puzzle, I will consider two competing
hypotheses-one fairly simple and straightforward; the other
more nuanced. The simple explanation is the change in parties
by John Jeffords, the one time Vermont Republican whose
decision to leave the Republican Party shifted control of the
Senate from Republican to Democratic hands. Before the
Jeffords switch, Democrats . did not resist Rehnquist Court
decision making because they were the minority party. Under
this view, recent Rehnquist Court decision . making did pit
Democrats (who dislike these decisions) against Republicans,
but Democrats were powerless to do anything about it. Today,
however, Senate Democrats can use the confirmation process
as a vehicle to express their disapproval of the Court.
I find this simple explanation unsatisfactory. While the
Jeffords switch is important,. I do not think that Democratic
complaints about the Rehnquist Court are tied either to party
control of the Senate or Democratic disappointment with
Rehnquist Court decision making. Instead, I will argue that
lawmaker objections to the Rehnquist Court are, more than
anything, tied to Democratic disapproval of the Republican
Senate's treatment of Clinton-era nominees, the increasing (at
least before September 11) polarization of Democratic and
Republican leadership, a corresponding desire among Senate
Democrats to exercise power, and bitterness over the Court's
decision in Bush v. Gore. 4 I will divide my comments into three
parts. In Part I, I will explain that Rehnquist Court decisions
hardly ever pit Democrats against Republicans and, as a result,
that Congress is not particularly concerned with the individual

on Docket, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2002, at Al.
3. Hearings, for example, have been held on the appropriateness of rejecting
Bush nominees because they do not provide ideological balance to this "far right"
Court.
4. 531 u.s. 98 (2000).
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decisions of the Rehnquist Court. In Part II, I will demonstrate
that lawmakers typically lack the incentives to attack Court
decisions limiting Congress's power on federalism grounds. In
Part III, I will explain why Senate Democrats nonetheless have
good reason to use the Senate's confirmation power as a way to
attack the Rehnquist Court.
I.

CONGRESSIONAL ACQUIESCENCE TO REHNQUIST COURT
DECISION MAKING: THE IRRELEVANCE OF PARTY
ALIGNMENTS

The willingness of lawmakers to take aim at the Supreme
Court is very much tied to partisan alignments within
Congress. For example,· Court-curbing proposals are often a
byproduct of shifting alignments within Congress-so that a
majority with differing constitutional views than the Court's
replaces a majority that generally accepts the Court's decision
making. 5 For this reason, treating the Jeffords switch as the
proximate cause of the Democrats new-found opprobrium of
Rehnquist Court decision making has intuitive appeal. Upon
closer examination, however, this explanation fails. The laws
the Court struck down cannot be characterized in such
partisan terms. And when Congress has enacted legislation in
response to Rehnquist Court rulings, it has done so in a
·bipartisan way.
Consider, for example, the most controversial of the
Rehnquist Court's federalism decisions-those invalidating all
or part of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), 6 the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 7 the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),8 the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),9 the Brady Act, 10 and the
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. 11 With the exception of the
VAWA and the ADEA, both Senate Democrats and Republicans
5. See generally Stuart S. Nagel, Court-Curbing Periods in American
History, 18 VAND. L. REV. 925 (1965) (detailing role of party alignments in Courtcurbing periods); Keith E. Whittington, Legislative Sanctions and the Strategic
Environment of Judicial Review, 1 I-CON: INT'L J. CONST. L. (forthcoming July
2003), available at http://www.princeton.edu/-kewhitt/strategic_context.pdf.
6. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
7. Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
8. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
9. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
10. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
11. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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co-sponsored each of these bills. 12 And with the exception of
the VAWA (where most Republicans voted against the
measure), each of these bills was enacted without dissent. 13 Of
course, it may be that Republicans were not strong supporters
of these measuresY Nonetheless, Republican co-sponsorship
and Republican votes cannot be dismissed.
12. The following table details the bipartisan nature of Congress's support
for these measures·
Gun-Free
School Zone
Act of 1990
Law:

ADEA

Brady Bill

(part of

(PL 90-202)*

(PL 103-159)

Crime

RFRA
(PL 103-141)

ADA
(PL 101-336)

Control Act

VAWAof
1994
(PL 103-322)

of 1990)
(PL 101-647)

CoSponsor(s):

Vote
(House):

Vote
(Senate):

6D

138D

1D

124 D

45D

17R

1R

47 R

18 R**

377-28

235-195

(voice vote)

(D 232-5)

(D 189-64)

(R 145-23)

(R 46-131)

344-13

238-187

313-1

(D 192-11)

(D 182-71)

(D 178-0)

(R 152-2)

(R66-116)

(R 135-1)

(voice vote)

(voice vote)

(voice vote)

3D

97-3

91-6

61-38

(D 54-2)

(054-0)

(D 52-2)

(R43-1)

(R37-6)

(R7-36)

House

0248

D 258

0260

D 258

D 260

0258

Members:

R 187

R 178

R 175

R 176

R 175

R 176

Senate

D64

057

055

D57

D55

D57

Members:

R36

R43

R45

R43

R46

R43

InformatiOn garnered from Thomas and CIS Congresswnal Unwerse, except for
* Vote info from Congressional Record and Age Discrimination, XXIII CONG. Q.
ALMANAC 658, 659 (1967).
** Thomas indicates one more co-sponsor than Congressional Universe for this
Act.
13. See id.
14. Consider, for example, Adarand Constructors, Inc. u. Pena , 515 U.S. 200
(1995), a 1995 decision restricting Congress's power to grant race-based
preferences (without explicitly overruling any federal statute).
Although
Republicans typically vote in favor of affirmative action legislation, there is little
reason to think that this support is heartfelt. For example, in explaining why
many Senate Republicans joined Congress's 1998 reaffirmation of federal
transportation set-asides, John McCain (R-Ariz.) argued that the costs of
repudiating affirmative action were simply too high: "The danger exists that our
[party's] aspirations and intentions will be misperceived, dividing our country and
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More significantly, even if some of the statutes struck
down were readily identifiable with Democratic interests,
including the VAWA, the ADA, the ADEA, and the Brady Act,
that characterization does not apply to several of the laws
struck down, including the RFRA, the Line Item Veto Act, 15 the
Communications Decency Act (CDA), 16 Miranda override
legislation, 17 and measures restricting the speech rights of
public employees and the legal services corporation. 18 Indeed,
as William Marshall points out in his contribution to this
symposium, decisions striking down these laws could be
characterized as "extreme liberal activism." 19 Consequently,
even if the Rehnquist Court is activist, its activism has not
exclusively targeted Democratic interests. 20
Not only do Rehnquist Court decisions fail to pit
Republicans against Democrats, there is little reason to think
that these decisions are of particular concern to Congress. For
the most part, Congress has simply ignored these decisions.
For example, the Congressional Record contains virtually no
commentary about the Court's action in these cases. With
three notable exceptions (the VAWA, the RFRA, and the Line
Item Veto Act), no more than four comments exist about the
wisdom of any of the Court's decisions. 21 Likewise, a search of
the Congressional Record suggests that Congress is not
concerned about the precedential value of these decisions.
Lawmakers have mentioned the precedential impact of City of
Boerne v. Flores, 22 which invalidated the RFRA, on only ten

harming our party." 144 CONG. REC. S1490 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1998).
15. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
16. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
17. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
18. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001); United States v.
Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995) (public employees).
19. William P. Marshall, Conservatives and the Seven Sins of Judicial
Activism, 73 U. CoLO. L. REV. 1217, 1247 (2002).
20. I do not mean to suggest here that the Rehnquist Court, in fact, is
activist. As Ernest Young details in his contribution to this symposium, judicial
activism is not easy to define-so much so that attacks on Rehnquist Court
activism may operate more as a political broadside than a principled critique.
Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1139, 1141 (2002).
21. LEXIS database search, Congressional Record, All Congress Combined,
for "Court" and either the name of the case or relevant law for the period of one
month following the date of the decision.
22. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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occasions,23 a startling fact when one considers that Boerne
embraced a standard of review that significantly curtailed
Congress's Section Five enforcement powers under the 14th
Amendment.
United States v. Lopez, 24 the case that
invalidated the Gun-Free School Zones Act, also has received
limited attention in congressional debates. Notwithstanding
the fact that Lopez was the first case in more than sixty years
to declare a federal statute outside Congress's Commerce
Clause power (and that it has since proven an instrumental
precedent in invalidating the VAWA), lawmakers have
mentioned Lopez's precedential impact only sixteen times. 25
Finally, the Court's anticommandeering cases, Printz v. United
States 26 and New York v. United States 27 have not figured into
congressional deliberations.
Members of Congress have
mentioned the precedential value of New York six times; 28
members have mentioned the. precedential value of Printz only
twice. 29
While these measures are somewhat artificial, they are
nonetheless telling.
At a minimum, they suggest that
lawmakers are not especially troubled about Rehnquist Court
decisions limiting Congress's power. For example, there is no
talk of curbing the Court's jurisdiction, of amending the
Constitution to nullify these decisions, of enacting legislation in

23. LEXIS database search, Congressional Record, All Congress Combined,
from June 25, 1997 (the date of the Boerne decision) to June 24, 2002. On nine
other occasions, Boerne was mentioned-principally in connection with efforts to
revamp the RFRA. See infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text (discussing
Congress's response to Boerne).
24. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
25. LEXIS database search, Congressional Record, All Congress Combined,
from April 26, 1995 (the date of the Lopez decision) to June 24, 2002. On fourteen
other occasions, Lopez was mentioned (nine times in connection with letters and
memoranda entered into the Congressional Record; five times in connection with
efforts to revamp the guns-in-schools law).
26. 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (invalidating background check provision of the
Brady Bill).
27. 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (invalidating legislation requiring states to either
find a way to dispose oflow-level radioactive waste or to "take title" of the waste).
28. LEXIS database search, Congressional Record, Ail· Congress Combined,
from June 19, 1992 (the date of the New York decision) until June 24, 2002.
29. LEXIS database search, Congressional Record, All Congress Combined,
from June 27, 1997 (the date of the Printz decision) to June 24, 2002. On several
other occasions, members of Congress have introduced letters, memoranda, and
resolutions that mention these cases-thirteen times for New York and three
times for Printz. Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of
Federalism: New York. Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 138.
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open defiance of the Court's ruling, or of refusing to comply
with these decisions. 30 Instead, as suggested above, there is
virtually no talk at all. Correspondingly, when Congress does
respond to the Court, it has been compliant. It has treated
Court rulings as final and authoritative-a precedent to deal
with, not to overrule.31 Consider, for example, lawmaker
efforts to respond to Court decisions invalidating the CDA, the
Gun-Free School Zones Act, and the VAWA-three of the four
statutes that Congress revised in response to Rehnquist Court
decision making. 32 The legislative histories of all three statutes
emphasize the need to conform with Supreme Court standards.
The Children's On-line Protection Act, 33 which replaced the
CDA, "address[ed} the specific concerns raised by the Supreme
Court,"34 including the lack of legislative hearings, the failure
to consider less restrictive alternatives, and the overbroad
definition of what constitutes indecency. 35 Likewise, when a
bipartisan coalition of senators introduced the Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Protection Act of 1996 (replacing the Gun
Free School Zone Act),36 their agenda was simple: "to heed the
30. These techniques are all examples of Court-curbing. See generally,
LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES, 200-230 (1988). For a more detailed
treatment of proposals stripping the Court of jurisdiction, see EDWARD KEYNES
WITH RANDALL K. MILLER, THE COURT V. CONGRESS: PRAYER, BUSING &
ABORTION (1989).
31. I do not mean to suggest that everyone in Congress bows before the
Court. On occasion; members of Congress have criticized Rehnquist Court
decision making. And in one instance (Congress's post-Boerne efforts to revamp
the RFRA), lawmakers considered enacting legislation casting doubt on the
Court's ruling. See infra notes 77--81 and accompanying text. But these are
exceptions to quite an overwhelming pattern of lawmaker disinterest or
acquiescence.
32. Congress also responded to the Court's decision invalidating the RFRA.
See infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text. Legislation responding to the
Court's age discrimination decision, Kimel, was introduced by a bipartisan
coalition oflawmakers in May 2001. See 147 CONG. REC. S5458 (daily ed. May
22, 2001) (statement of Sen. Jeffords). Legislation has also been introduced to
overturn some of the Court's sovereign immunity decisions. In June 1999 and
November 2001, Senator Patrick Leahy introduced legislation that would make
states liable for violations of federal intellectual property laws. 147 CONG. REC.
Sl1,364 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 2001) (statement of Sen. Leahy). The 1999 bill died in
committee; the 2001 bill is now being considered by the Senate Judiciary
Committee.
33. 15 u.s.c. § 6501 (2002).
34. H.R. REP. No. 105-775, at 12 (1998).
35. Id.
36. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(a) (2002). When the Act was introduced, it was
called the Gun Free School Zone Act of 1995. 141 CoNG. REC. S7919 (daily ed.
June 7, 1995).
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Supreme Court's decision regarding Federal power and yet to
continue to fight against school violence."37 Finally, when
responding to the decision overturning VAWA, a bipartisan
coalition of lawmakers (including John Ashcroft (R-Mo.), Paul
Wellstone (D-Minn.), Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), and Joseph Eiden
(D-Del.)) made no effort to revive the right to sue provision
struck down by the Supreme Court.38 Instead, lawmakers
focused their energies on federal funding directed at the
prevention of domestic violence.39
To summarize: There is little reason to think that Senate
Democrat complaints about the Rehnquist Court are tied to
party control of the Senate. Rehnquist Court decision making
has targeted both liberal and conservative causes. Moreover,
most of the federal laws the Rehnquist Court struck down were
bipartisan measures. Finally, members of Congress have had
precious little to say about Court decisions striking down their
handiwork-suggesting that lawmakers are not particularly
concerned with the individual decisions of the Rehnquist Court.
Indeed, when responding to Court decisions, lawmakers devote
their attention to complying with Court edicts, not criticizing
the Court.

II. WHY LAWMAKERS HAVE LITTLE INCENTIVE TO ATTACK
REHNQUIST COURT FEDERALISM DECISIONS

The question remains: If the Rehnquist Court, by striking
down Republican, Democratic, and bipartisan initiatives, is an
equal-opportunity activist, what explains Congress's apparent
disinterest (at least before Bush-era confirmation battles) in
these decisions? I think there are two explanations. The first
is quite narrow and contextual, and focuses both on the
specifics of the decisions and the social and political forces
surrounding these decisions. In particular, Rehnquist Court
37. Id. at 87920 (statement of Sen. Kohl); see also Guns in Schools: A
Federal Role?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Youth Violence of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 9 (1995) (statement of Walter Dellinger,
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel) (explaining how the statute
conforms to Lopez).
38. On the House side, however, some Democratic lawmakers sought
(unsuccessfully) to include a civil legal remedy in the statute. H.R. REP. No. 106891, at n.31 (2000).
39. The Violence Against Women Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat.
1491 (codified as enacted, amended and repealed sections of 8, 18, 20, 28, 42
U.S.C.).
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decision making is narrow enough to allow Congress to address
the same issue through an alternative source of federal power,
especially Congress's spending power.40
Moreover, these
decisions are in sync with increasing populist distrust of
Congress.41 In contrast to this narrow explanation, the second
explanation is quite broad. Specifically, Congress typically
lacks incentives to respond to Supreme Court federalism
decisions. In part, lawmakers and interest group lobbies pay
little attention to federalism qua federalism. Their interest,
instead, lies in the substantive issues that the Court examines,
such as the environment, labor, and civil rights. Furthermore,
when it comes to federalism, Court rulings rarely foreclose
democratic solutions. Lawmakers at both the federal and state
level can return to the substantive issues implicated by the
Court's federalism decision making.

A. The Narrow Explanation
In large measure, Rehnquist Court federalism decisions
have not destabilized either Congress or the interest groups
that lobby Congress. 42 As such, it is little wonder that
Congress, a reactive institution, 43 sees these decisions as no
more than a blip on its radar screen. Specifically, Rehnquist
Court federalism decisions have not prevented Congress from
responding to constituent demands.
The Court, while
invalidating scores of federal laws, has only had to overturn
three of its precedents.44 More significantly, most of these

40. For additional discussion, see infra note 45.
41. For additional discussion, see infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
42. For a more detailed discussion of my thinking on this subject, see Neal
Devins, Congress as Culprit: How Lawmakers Spurred on the Court's AntiCongress Crusade, 51 DUKE L.J. 435 (2001).
43. For the classic treatment of how lawmakers respond to "fire alarms"
triggered by constituents, see Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz,
Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 165 (1984).
44. See College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666, 680 (1999) (rejecting the constructive waiver doctrine of Parden v.
Terminal Railway, 377 U.S. 184 (1964)); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,
66 (1996) (rejecting Congress's power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment via a
statute enacted under the Commerce Clause, overturning Pennsylvania v. Union
Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989)); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227
(1995) (holding that federal affirmative action programs are subject to strict
scrutiny review, not intermediate review, overturning Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990)). For a competing view (focusing on how political
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decisions have been narrow in scope, striking down only parts
of the statute and/or allowing Congress an opportunity to
revisit the issue by making use of another source of federal
power. 45 Also, because much of what is struck down is
duplicative of state enactments,46 Congress has felt relatively
little constituent pressure to respond to the Court. And finally,
many of the statutes struck down relate to issues, especially
crime, where politicians may· care more about taking a position
(by voting for the legislation) than they care about the
successful implementation of the law. 47
Popular
attitudes
towards
lawmaking
and,
correspondingly, Congress's increasing emphasis on message
politics also explains Congress's failure to target Rehnquist
Court decision making. Before the September 11 terrorist
attacks, voters looked less and less to Congress to solve the
nation's problems. Distrust of the federal government and,
with it, low expectations of congressional performance hit
record levels. 48 With voters expecting less and less from
Congress, the lawmaking culture has been radically
transformed. For example, rather than blame the Supreme
Court for standing in the way of lawmaker initiatives,
Congress is more apt to blame itself for the failings of
conservatives have little regard for precedent), see Marshall, supra note 19, at
1232-36. See also Michael Stokes Paulsen, Activist Judicial Restraint (2002)
(unpublished manuscript prepared for this symposium) (arguing that stare decisis
is a type of judicial activism and, as such, adherence to precedent is itself activist).
45. In this symposium, see Young, supra note 20, at 1167-68 (characterizing
Rehnquist Court decision making as "minimalist" in character). See generally
Adrian Vermeule, Does Commerce Clause Review Have Perverse Effects?, 46 VILL.
L. REV. 1325 (2001) (arguing that Congress can enact more comprehensive
regulatory schemes than those struck down by the Court); T.R. Goldman,
Lawmakers Take Steps to Respond After Legislation is Found Unconstitutional,
LEGAL TIMES, July 14, 1997, at 8 (same).
46. States, for example, regularly criminalize gun possession at schools and
domestic violence. More generally, Congress often enacts criminal statutes which
do little more than duplicate state laws, including drug crimes, caijacking, failure
to pay child support, embezzlement from an insurance company, and drive-by
Edwin Meese III, Big Brother on the Beat: The Expanding
shootings.
Federalization of Crime, 1 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1, 3 (1997); Seth P. Waxman, Does
the Solicitor General Matter?, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1123 (2001) (casting doubt
on the necessity of the VAWA).
47. See Keith E. Whittington, Taking What They Give Us: Explaining the
Court's Federalism Offensive, 51 DUKE L.J. 477, 511-13 (2001).
48. For a detailing of opinion polls and a thoughtful examination of how
voter distrust has contributed to Rehnquist Court decision making, see
Christopher H. Schroeder, Causes of the Recent Turn in Constitutional
Interpretation, 51·DUKE L.J. 307 (2001).
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government by pushing such measures as term limit proposals
and the line item veto. 49 Correspondingly, by placing more
emphasis on their parties' message, and less emphasis on
legislative outputs,50 Republicans and Democrats alike discount
what happens to legislation after it is enacted-including a
court decision striking down legislation. 51
Finally, Congress is not particularly disappointed with
Court decision making. Unlike Court-curbing periods, many
members of Congress are sympathetic to the Court's efforts to
protect state prerogatives. 52
For this very reason,
Representative Lee Hamilton (D-Ind.), after observing that
lawmakers seemed "detached from the actual work of the
federal judiciary," speculated that Congress "has become more
conservative, and many members are comfortable with most of
the Court's rulings."53 Moreover, Congress was on notice that
its handiwork was vulnerable to judicial challenges. For
example, when enacting the RFRA and the VAWA, academic
experts, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and the Judicial Conference
signaled that these laws were constitutionally suspect. 54 More
49. On the line item veto, for example, Sen. Dan Coats (R-Ind.) and others
argued: Congress "cannot discipline itself. . . [It) is selfish and greedy and ...
cannot put the national interest ahead of parochial interests or special interests."

Line-Item Veto: Joint Hearing Before the House Comm. on Government Reform
and Oversight and the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 104th Cong. 22
(1995).
50. See generally C. Lawrence Evans, Committees, Leaders and Message
Politics, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 217 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I.
Oppenheimer eds., 7th ed. 2000). For additional discussion of message politics,
see infra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
51. Along the same lines, lawmakers, rather than negotiate with the White
House over the terms of legislation, often enact legislation "deliberately designed
to provoke a presidential veto." John B. Gilmour, Institutional and Individual
Influences on the President's Veto, 64 J. POL. 198 (2002).
52. Whittington, supra note 47, at 512-15 (noting that lawmakers are not
upset by Rehnquist Court federalism decision making because lawmakers still
reap political benefits for voting on laws criminalizing gun possession, genderrelated violence, etc.).
53. 144 CONG. REC. E48-01 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Hamilton). See also supra notes 21-39 and accompanying text (suggesting that
Congress is not especially interested in whether the judiciary upholds its
handiwork-so long as lawmakers are able to reward constituents through the
bills they approve); Devins, supra note 42, at 461 (same).
54. For example, in 1992 (in a piece that took aim at the proposed VAWA),
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that Congress ought to "avoiq adding new federal
causes of action unless critical to meeting important national interests that
cannot otherwise be satisfied through nonjudicial forums, alternative dispute
resolution techniques, or the state courts." William H. Rehnquist, Congress Is

Crippling Federal Courts, Ever-Expanding Number of 'Federal' Crimes Belong in
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telling, concerns over the possible success of a court challenge
prompted Congress to provide for expedited Supreme Court
review. of the CDA, the Line Item Veto Act, and census reform
legislation. 55
The Rehnquist Court's willingness to strike down federal
statutes coincides with Congress's increasing willingness to see
Supreme Court decisions as final and authoritative and,
correspondingly, its practice of placing less emphasis on what
happens to legislation after it is enacted. 56 With the public
expecting less from Congress, moreover, these decisions reflect
populist norms. It is little wonder therefore that Congress is
loathe to attack the Court for its decision making. And since
lawmakers can revisit the issue by making use of an
alternative source of federal power, Rehnquist Court
federalism decisions do not prevent Congress from responding
to constituent pressures.

B.

The Broad Explanation

Congress's disinterest in recent Supreme Court federalism
decisions can also be attributed to the fact that Congress does
not care about federalism qua federalism. 57 Federalism's
saliency corresponds to the substantive issues that the Court
examines (domestic violence, religious liberty, disability rights,
State Courts Instead, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 16, 1992, at 3B. By
extending Rehnquist's complaint to the Gun Free School Zone Act (invalidated in
Lopez), Congress should have been aware of the judiciary's growing skepticism of
the federalization of crime. Also, with respect to the RFRA, law professor
witnesses warned Congress that the statute was constitutionally suspect
(especially if Congress failed to make extensive findings of fact, something that
Congress failed to do). See, e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 331 (1992) (testimony of Professor Douglas
Laycock); id. at 390-91 (testimony of Professor Ira C. Lupu).
55. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat.
133, 142-43; Line Item Veto Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200,
1211; Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, 111 Stat. 2440, 2482
(1997).
56. And this, of course, is both a byproduct and a cause of voters' lower
expectations for congressional performance (at least before September 11). See
supra note 48 and accompanying text.
57. In sharp contrast, New Deal lawmakers cared a great deal about
Lochner Court decision making because "it rendered impossible the central
political goals of the newly empowered Democratic Party." Whittington, supra
note 47, at 509.
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etc.), not the question of the appropriate division of power
between the federal and state government. Thus, when
responding to federalism decisions that implicate civil and
individual rights, Congress has little incentive to strip the
Court of jurisdiction, amend the Constitution, or engage in
other Court-curbing activities. Instead, its incentives cut in
favor of enacting alternative legislation consistent with the
Court's decision.
In concluding that today's Congress is uninterested in
federalism qua federalism, I looked at the following sources:
judicial confirmation hearings, party platforms, interest group
web pages, opinion polls, and lawmaker commentary on
Supreme Court federalism decisions. None of these sources
suggest that federalism, by itself, significantly interests
Congress and its constituents.58 Lawmakers barely mentioned
federalism, for example, in the confirmation hearings,
committee reports, or floor debates concerning Supreme Court
nominees Sandra Day O'Connor, Clarence Thomas, David
Souter, and Stephen Breyer. 59 In the cases of O'Connor and
Souter, this disinterest is especially telling. O'Connor called
attention to the fact that her "experience[s] as a State court
judge and as a state legislator" gave her "a greater appreciation
of the important role that States play in our federal system."60
Souter, the so-called "stealth nominee," had no known views on
federalism-suggesting that the Senate had real incentives to
question him on matters that critically concerned Judiciary
Committee members.61 Similarly, interest groups steered clear

58. Admittedly, my research was selective. For example, I did not look at
every judicial confirmation hearing; instead, I focused on hearings where I
thought federalism issues might come up. At the same time, the paucity of
references to federalism-qua-federalism suggests that my conclusion is defensible.
For a related argument, see generally ROBERT F. NAGEL, THE IMPLOSION OF
AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2001) (observing that national players do not value state
contributions and, as such, are apt to degenerate federalism).
59. With respect to Justices Thomas and Breyer, federalism issues were
largely ignored in Senate questioning of the nominees. According to my survey of
these confirmation hearings, Thomas was only asked twice and Breyer was only
asked once about federalism.
60. The Nomination of Judge Sandra Day O'Connor of Arizona to Serve as
an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 59 (1981). O'Connor was asked
four questions about federalism-related issues. There were no federalism-related
references in the Judiciary Committee report supporting her nomination.
61. Souter was asked four questions about federalism during his three days
of testimony. There were no federalism-related references in the Judiciary
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of federalism-related issues when testifying about these
nominees. For example, with the exception of the Coalition for
America, no interest group testified (or, for that matter, wrote
Congress) about federalism-related issues at either the Thomas
or Breyer confirmation hearings. 62
Just as federalism issues are not a predominant concern
for Congress, federalism issues likewise are not a concern of
interest group lobbies.
Federalism and other structural
matters are not at the heart of the "mission statements" of
these groups, especially left-leaning interests.63 Likewise,
opinion polls suggest that federalism decisions, even those
implicating individual rights, are of little interest to the
public. 64 Indeed, although the Gallup Organization conducted
opinion polls on Rehnquist Court rulings on partial birth
abortion, physician assisted suicide, the Boy Scouts' exclusion
of gays, and student-led prayer, it did not bother to conduct
polls on any of the Rehnquist Court's federalism decisions. 65
Against this backdrop, it is little wonder that party platforms
gloss over federalism. 66 Along the same lines, the handful of
Committee report supporting his nomination.
News coverage of Souter's
confirmation likewise ignored federalism. A survey of stories and editorials run in
The New York Times, The Washington Post, The L.A. Times, and The Wall Street
Journal reveals that federalism received one or two passing references and
nothing else.
62. A quick scan of interest group testimony at the O'Connor and Souter
confirmation hearings likewise suggests interest group lack of interest in
federalism.
63. I looked at web sites for the following groups: the National Organization
for Women, the National Women's Law Center, the National Abortion Rights
Action League, the ACLU, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, and the AFL-CIO.
While some web pages condemn recent federalism decisions, they do so against
the backdrop of the group's substantive agenda, e.g., women's rights, antidiscrimination protections in the workplace. As to why I looked at these groups as
well as the relevance of interest groups in shaping lawmaker consideration of
constitutional questions, see Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Lobbying for
Justice: Organized Interests, Supreme Court Nominations, and the United States
Senate, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 499 (1998).
64. And while the public does not tell the Gallup organization what issues
are of interest to it, I do think it reasonable to look to opinion polls as one measure
of what is and is not salient. Moreover, when it comes to Supreme Court decision
making, the sad fact is that the public is hardly ever aware of Court decisions.
See David Adamany & Joel B. Grossman, Support for the Supreme Court as a
National Policymaker, 5 LAW & POL'y Q. 405, 407 (1983) (citing studies).
65. Likewise, presidential candidates George W. Bush and Al Gore were not
asked about the Court's federalism decisions in any of their presidential debates.
66. Judicial enforcement of federalism was not mentioned in either the 2000
Democratic or Republican Party Platforms. The Democratic platform emphasized
the need for "women and minorities" to fill judicial vacancies as well as the need
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lawmakers who have criticized Rehnquist Court federalism
decisions typically focus their energies on civil and individual
rights concerns, not the balance of power implications of these
decisions. 67
No doubt, Congress and its constituents see Supreme
Court federalism decision making as a second-order issue. Its
salience is linked to the civil and individual rights issues that,
for lawmakers and their constituents, define the Court. 68
Rehnquist-era federalism decisim1 making, however, implicates
civil and individual rights. By limiting Congress's power to
regulate noneconomic activity (VAWA) and to extend civil
rights protections against the states (RFRA, ADA, ADEA),
Rehnquist Court federalism decision· making has limited the
political victories of women's interests, the disabled, senior
citizens, and religious minorities. 69
Why then hasn't Congress launched any meaningful attack
against Rehnquist Court decisio:q. making? More to the point,
are the explanations suggested above enough to explain
for courts to protect "individual rights . . . including the right to privacy."
Prosperity, Progress, and Peace 26, available at Democratic National Committee,
About the DNC, Democratic Party Platform http://www.democrats.org/
about/platform.html (last visited May 29, 2002). The Republican Platform spoke
of "judicial supremacy" and "[a]varice among ... plaintiffs' lawyers." Government
for the People 4, available at Republican National Committee, About our Party,
Platform http://www.rnc.org/GOPinfo/Platform/2000platform7 (last visited May
20, 2002).
The Republican Platform also expressed concern over court's
invalidating citizen referenda. Those laws, however, have not been invalidated on
federalism grounds. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating
Colorado initiative implicating gay rights on equal protection grounds).
67. I do not mean to suggest that balance of powers concerns are .n ever
raised by Congress. In particular, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) and Senator
Joseph Biden (D-Del.) have. both criticized the Court for improperly second
guessing congressional factfinding. See 146 CONG. REC. S7758 (daily ed. July 27,
2000) (statement of Sen. Leahy); id. at S7590 (statement of Sen. Biden). For
further discussion, see infra notes 77-80.
68. For an insightful explanation on why it is that courts-in bargaining
with Congress and the White House over the scope of their powers-see individual
rights as the source of their power, see John 0. McGinnis, Constitutional Review
by the Executive in Foreign Affairs and War Powers: A Consequence of Rational
Choice in the Separation of Powers, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 293, 306-07
(1993).
69. African-American interests also have reason to fear the Rehnquist
Court. In particular, the logic of the Court's Section Five decision making is in
tension with voting rights legislation. See Ellen Katz, The End of Reconstruction:
Congres, Race, and Political Participation in the Rehnquist and Waite Courts
(2002) (unpublished manuscript prepared for: this symposium); see also Marshall,
supra note 19, at 1246 (calling attention to ways that the Rehnquist Court has
facilitated non-minority challenges to race preferences).
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Congress's acquiescence? The answer is a qualified "no." Even
if it strongly disapproves of federalism-based decision making,
Congress has little incentive to attack the Court when, and if,
it responds to these decisions. Specifically, lawmakers and
interest groups can find ways to respond to the Court's
federalism decisions without seeking to curb the Court's
jurisdiction or otherwise attack it. For example, if Congress
does not like a decision, it can make use of alternative theories
of power. 70 Also, several of the decisions left much of the
relevant statutory program in effect, 71 allowed for injunctive
relief, 72 and/or spoke of ways in which Congress could respond
to the decision. 73 Finally, other governmental actors-states
and municipalities-can fill the void when Congress cannot. 74
In other words, because Rehnquist-era federalism decisions
allow elected officials and interest groups other avenues to
pursue the same objectives as the laws that the Court struck
down, Congress has little reason to pursue politically costly
Court-curbing proposals. 75
In contrast, a ruling limiting governmental power over
civil and individual rights, such as abortion, school prayer, flag
burning, or busing, settles the issue for all parts of government.
Consider, for example, abortion.
After Roe, no unit of
government could regulate first trimester abortions. And while

70. See supra note 45.
71. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
72. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
73. See, e.g., Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
74. Following Garrett (ADA) and Boerne (RFRA), for example, several states
enacted legislation providing for the very protections that the Supreme Court
ruled that Congress was without the authority to mandate. See Helen Irvin,
Several States Respond to Garrett Decision, Consider Waiving Immunity to ADA
Lawsuits, 70 U.S.L.W. 2003 (2001) (discussing bills introduced in the immediate
aftermath of Garrett, including legislation introduced in Minnesota, Rhode Island,
California, and New York); Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious
Exemptions, 46 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1465 (1999) (discussing state RFRAs). Also,
several states criminalize domestic violence (the subject of the VAWA) and gun
possession near schools (the subject of the Gun-Free School Zones Act). See supra
note 46.
75. For a recent treatment of the political costs of Court-curbing, see
generally John Ferejohn, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining
Judicial IndepAndence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 353 (1999). For additional discussion,
see infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text. And if that is not enough, Congress
is limited in the ways it can curb the Court in response to its federalism decisions;
for example, it makes little sense to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction on
issues in which the courts are needed to enforce congressional mandates.
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government could express its disapproval of this decision
through appropriations riders and other indirect techniques, it
could only attack the heart of the decision by attacking the
decision itself. For this reason, Roe prompted proposals to strip
the courts of jurisdiction, to amend the Constitution, and to
enact human life legislation. 76
No federalism-related decision backs government into a
similar corner. This, of course, is not to say that these
decisions are inconsequential, but rather that, when
responding to these decisions, elected officials need not resort
to Court-curbing techniques. When thinking about these
decisions, Congress has more incentive to rewrite the law to
correct the defect that the Court identified than it has to get
the Court to rethink its federalism jurisprudence.
One possible exception to this rule is Congress's response
to Boerne (the decision invalidating the RFRA), but this is the
exception that proves the soundness of the rule. Unlike the
calm that has followed other Rehnquist-era federalism
decisions, Boerne prompted numerous expressions of
disappointment with the Court, several legislative hearings,
and, on one occasion, talk of Court-curbing. 77 At the same time,
federalism played no role in all of this. Instead, Congress
focused on its disapproval of the Supreme Court's restrictive
approach to religious liberty. 78 Specifically, when Congress
enacted the RFRA, Congress was responding to Employment
Division v. Smith, a 1990 Supreme Court decision allowing
government to burden religious exercise without satisfying
either prong of strict scrutiny review. 79 As such, like the
76. For a detailing of government responses to Roe, see BARBARA CRAIG
HINKSON & DAVID M. O'BRIEN, ABORTION AND AMERICAN POLITICS (1993).
77. For hearings focusing on possible legislative responses to Boerne, see
Protecting Religious Freedom After Boerne v. Flores: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong.
(1997); Congress' Constitutional Role in Protecting Religious Liberty: Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997). For hearings
(prompted by Boerne) discussing Court-curbing and other legislative checks on the
judiciary, see Congress, the Court, and the Constitution: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong.
(1998).
78. See Neal Devins, How Not to Challenge the Court, 39 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 645 (1998) (portraying the RFRA as special interest legislation, with
lawmakers validating religious interest group criticisms of Supreme Court
religious liberty decision making).
79. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Rather than require the government to satisfy
either the compelling interest prong or least restrictive prong of strict scrutiny
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human life legislation designed statutorily to overturn Roe, the
RFRA was Congress's attempt stautorily to. ov_erturn Supreme
Court standards governing religious liberty. 80 Lawmakers
never lost sight of this rights-oriented objective and the
wrongness of Smith remained the focus of hearings and
legislation responding to Boerne. 81
The lesson here is simple: Congress is a reactive
institution and, consequently, Supreme Court rulings
invalidating federal or state legislation operate as fire alarms
demanding a response. On rights issues, the only effective
response may involve one or another Court-curbing technique.
Regarding federalism, lawmakers and their constituents may
avail themselves of less draconian techniques. Of course, were
the Rehnquist Court to step up its anti-Congress campaign and
issue decisions that further narrow Congress's power, retooling
federalism decision making may become the only way for
Congress and its constituents to advance their agenda. Until
that time, however, there is little incentive for either
Democrats or Republicans in Congress to respond to individual
federalism decisions by seeking a broader reexamination of the
Court's jurisprudence.

review, Smith embraced deferential rational basis review.
80. The legislative history of the RFRA is filled with statements to this
effect. Smith, for example, was condemned as "disastrous," "dastardly and
unprovoked," "devastating," and "degrad[ing]." 139 CONG. REC. H2359 (1993)
(statement of Rep. Nadler); 137 CONG. REC. E2422 (1991) (statement of Rep.
Solarz); 139 CONG. REC. H2361 (statement of Rep. Schumer); id. (statement of
Rep. Orton). For his part, President Clinton, when signing the bill, spoke of his
conviction that the RFRA "is far more consistent with the intent of the Founders
of this Nation than the [Smith] decision." Remarks on Signing the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2000 (Nov. 16, 1993).
81. Witness, for example, Senator Orrin Hatch's (R-Utah) opening
comments at 1998 hearings· on the Religious Liberty Protection Act. After
observing that this "legislation seeks to protect the right of religious freedom in
cooperation with the Supreme Court," Hatch remarked: "Clearly, it would have
been preferable if the Court r~turned to its previous [pre-Smith] solicitude for
religious liberty claims. But, until it does, this Congress will do what it can to
protect religious freedom: in cooperation with the Court." The Religious Liberty
and Charitable Donation Protection Act of 1998: Hearing Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 1 (1998).
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III. WHY SENATE DEMOCRATS HAVE STRONG INCENTIVES TO
ATTACK REHNQUIST COURT DECISION MAKING WHEN
CONFIRMING BUSH JUDICIAL APPOINTEES

The confirmation process operates around a different set of
incentives than federalism decision making. While Senate
Democrats have little incentive to attack Rehnquist-era
federalism decision making as."activist," they have quite strong
incentives to speak of "conservative judicial activism" when
battling President Bush's judicial nominees. 82 In so doing,
Senate Democrats may well make Rehnquist-era federalism
decisions the focal point of confirmation battles with both the
Bush White House and their Republican colleagues. And while
the Jeffords switch (for reasons I will soon explain) helps fuel
this campaign against "conservative judicial activism," the
incentives for Senate Democrats to resist Bush judicial
appointees, ultimately, has relatively little to do with which
party controls the Senate.
Democrats will always have incentive to attack the judicial
appointees of a Republican president and Republicans will
always have incentive to attack Democratic appointees. 83
Specifically, the forward-looking nature of the confirmation
process exacerbates increasing polarization within Congress,
including each party's desire to send a distinctive message and
pay the other party back for its partisan decision making.
Correspondingly, because Court decision making is
consequential (especially on civil and individual rights),
lawmakers often see the confirmation process as a politically
salient way to advance their ideological preferences. In the
82. When politicians speak of "judicial activism," I think that they are
making use of an empty label to achieve a political result. For more detailed
elaborations of this point, see Mark V. Tushnet, The Role of the Supreme Court:
Judicial Activism or Self-Restraint?, 47 MD. L. REV. 147 (1987); William Wayne
Justice, The Two Faces of Judicial Activism, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1992). See
also Taylor, supra note 2, at 1816.
83. For this very reason, Senate Democrats-before the Jeffords switchsignaled Republicans that they were willing to go to war over federal judicial
nominations; in particular, by fighting hard against confirming Ted Olson
(Solicitor General) and John Ashcroft (Attorney General), Senate Democrats made
clear that they were willing to do what it takes to derail unacceptable Bush
nominees. See Alison Mitchell, Senate Confirms Ashcroft as Attorney General, 58·
42, Closing a Five- Week Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2001, at A1 (the Senate was
"sending Mr. Bush 'as clear a message as we can' about future nominations,
particularly for the Supreme Court."); Neil A. Lewis, Panel Still Split on Solicitor
General Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2001, at A21.
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pages that follow, I will flesh out the above explanation by way
of a laundry list of (somewhat overlapping) .themes explaining
why Senate Democrats likely will treat recent federalism
decisions as a focal point of controversial confirmation
hearings:
Federalism as Proxy. Because Rehnquist Court federalism
decision making is very much linked to civil and individual
rights, a nominee's views on these Rehnquist Court decisions
aguably act as a proxy to gauge how that nominee will
approach all issues implicating civil and individual rights.
Mter all, common sense suggests · that a judge who
embraces states' rights arguments is ·more skeptical of topdown national solutions-whether their source is Congress ot
the courts-than a judge who is skeptical of states' rights. Put
another way, for a judge who embraces state and local control,
why should it matter if the .national solution emanates from
Congress (the ADA, the VAWA, the RFRA, etc.), or from the
courts through expansive interpretations of statutes and
constitutional provisions implicating civil and individual
rights? Consequently, even for Senators and interest groups
that do not care all that much about federalism, these cases
may nevertheless serve as a good measuring stick of a nominee .
. The Forward-Looking Nature of Confirmation Hearings.
The widely held belief that the Court is trustworthy, especially
as compared to Congress, limits Congress's power to attack
indh;·idual Supreme Court decisions. 84 In contrast, judicial
nominees cannot claim that they have a vested right to Senate
confirmation. Consequently, while Congress will pay an
institutional price when it responds to Court decision making
through Court-curbing proposals,85 almost no consequences
stem from resisting White House efforts to fill the federal
84. Eighty-one percent of Americans, in a June 2001 Gallup poll, said that
they have "some," "quite a lot," or a "great deal" of confidence in the Supreme
Court. Gallup Poll, Roper Center for Public Opinion (June 8-10, 2001) (on file
with author). For data showing widespread distrust of Congress, see Schroeder,
supra note 48, at 346-349. . See also ·Barry Friedman, The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law's Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971
(2000) (highlighting public support for Supreme Court's legitimacy at the very
time that FDR challenged that legitimacy through his Court-packing proposal).
85. See Ferejohn, supra note 75, at 357; Whittington, supra note 5, at 17-18.
It is also noteworthy that FDR suffered huge costs for his Court-packing proposal.
In particular, "[t)he conservative opposition to Roosevelt crystallized around the
Court issue." David M. Kennedy, How FDR Derailed the New Deal, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, July 1995, at 87.
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bench with judges sympathetic to the president's agenda. For
example, Senators ·can talk about how.future appointees may
undermine Roe, the separation of church and state, and so on.86
By· speaking in such forward-looking generalities, Senate
Democrats can target nominees for things they have not done,
but may do. These types of forward-looking attacks, moreover,
are difficult to defend against, because it is impossible for. a
nominee to prove that she will not behave a certain way in the
future.
The· Packaging of Federalism Decisions. For Senate
Democrats (many of whom are interested in derailing Bush
judicial appointees),87 Rehnquist Court federalism decisions are
far easier to package than Court decisions on abortion, religion,
speech, gay rights, and stare decisis. 88 In particular, the Court
has not acted monolithically in its substantive civil and
individual rights decisions-issuing several important rulings
that have either expanded or preserved civil rights and
individual liberties. 89 In contrast, no important federalism
cases exist which reaffirm Congress's power to protect civil and
individual rights90 and, as such, the federalism cases can be

86. The classic example ·of such a parade of future horribles is the Bork
confirmation hearing. For an insider's account-of how the anti-Bork forces sought
to attack Bork t}).is way, S(le MARK GITENSTEIN, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE, 95-98
(1992).
87. As to why Democrats are interested in limiting Bush this way, seflinfra
notes 100-108 and accompanying text.
. 88. On race issues, it is easier to cast the Rehnquist Court as "anti-civil
rights." For example, as Bill Marshall points out in his contribution to this
symposium, several Court rulings can be seen as setbacks to minority interests.
See Marshall, supra note 19, at 1227-29. At the same time, the Court has yet to
invalidate a federal affirmative action program. Also, it has ruled that race can
be used as a factor in districting. Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999).
Finally, it has reaffirmed Congress's authority to enact voting rights legislation.
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997).
89. See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 530 U.S. 533 (2001)
(invalidating restrictions on the use of federal funds by legal services); Stenberg v.
Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (invalidating Nebraska's partial birth abortion
statute); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (reaffirming and
extending Miranda on· stare decisis grounds); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe,
530 U.S. 290 (2000) (extending school prayer decision to student-led prayer at a
football game); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (invalidating Communications
Decency Act); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating Colorado
legislation prohibiting the granting of "protected status" to gays and lesbians);
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, . 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (invoking stare decisis to
uphold Roe).
90. There is one arguable exception here, namely, City of Boerne u. Flores
(RFRA). 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Specifically, the Boerne Court made clear that its
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packaged together in a way that civil and individual rights
cases cannot. Moreover., .the .federalism ,cases. act as a better
focal point because they cut across a broad· range of interests,
including those of women's groups, the disabled, the aged, and
religious minorities.91
Symbolic and Message Politics. Judicial appointments,
especially Supreme Court appointments, are high visibility
events. Interest groups sometimes announce their opposition
to a candidate by taking out full page ads in major newspapers.
Television and other media coverage is extensive and a
plethora of books discuss controversial confirmation hearings.
Given the real world and symbolic importance of the
appointment process, it is little wonder that Democrats would
want to use·confirmation hearings as a way of communicating
to voters and interest group constituents that they are the
party of civil and individual rights. 92 As a result, Republicans
and Democrats increasingly see the lawmaking process as
expressive-a way for the members of each party to coalesce
behind the party's policy agenda. 93 By focusing their efforts on
decision invalidating the RFRA did not put into doubt earlier Court rulings
affirming 1960s voting rights legislation. 521 U.S. at 518. At the same time, as
Ellen Katz points out in her contribution to this symposium, the Rehnquist
Court's Section Five cases cast doubt on the 1982 amendments to the Voting
Rights Act. Katz, supra note 69.
91. Old habits die hard, of course. And it may be that the chestnuts used to
attack Bork and Thomas (privacy, stare decisis, etc.) may again emerge as the
principal line of attack against Bush nominees. Consider, for example, the Senate
Judiciary Committee's rejection of Bush appeals court nominee Priscilla Owen.
See Neil A. Lewis, Democrats Reject Bush Pick in Battle Over Court Balance, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 6, 2002, at Al. Specifically, Senate Democrats attacked Owen as
being a ''judicial activist" because, as a Texas Supreme Court Justice, she broadly
interpreted state law restrictions on minor abortion rights. See Neil A. Lewis,
Hearing Starts with Judicial Nominee in Defensive Mode, N.Y. TIMES, July 24,
2002, at A15. Furthermore, since federalism is a new tune to play and the real
concern is about civil and individual rights, lawmakers may be more concerned
about "conservative activists" disregarding stare decisis and returning both
abortion and school prayer to the states. For this very reason, abortion and civil
rights have been front and center in the confirmation hearings of Bush appellate
court nominees Michael McConnell and Miguel Estrada. See Charles Lane,
Nominee for Court Faces Two Battles; WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 2002, at Al.
Moreover, in the wake of the September 11 tragedy, lawmakers may be especially
interested in a nominee's views on laws that restrict civil liberties in the name of
national security.
92. In particular, by inviting interest group representatives to testify at
these hearings as well as including interest group representatives in strategy
sessions, confirmation hearings are an excellent way for lawmakers to solidify the
support of their base constituents.
93. See Evans, supra note 50; see also John E. Owens, Gingrich's House Has
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the message it is sending, Senate Democrats have strong
incentives to use .the confirmation process to demonstrate that
their vision of the federal judiciary (a Court that protects civil
and individual rights) is at odds with the Republican vision.
Towards this end, Senators Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) and
Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.) are playing a leadership role in
defining the Democrats' message on issues related to the
composition of the Court. Through newspaper editorials,94
television appearances,95 floor statements,96 and especially
through hearings on Rehnquist Court decision making,97
Senators Leahy and Schumer are seeking to establish a twopronged message, namely: (1) the Rehnquist Court's federalism
campaign is "conservative," "activist," and targeting civil rights
and individual liberties, and (2} Democrats must work hard to
ensure ideological balance on a Supreme Court run amok. In
sorting out this message, forty-two of the Senate's fifty
Democrats attended a retreat in which law professors briefed
Senators both on the need to prevent President Bush from
"pack[ing] the courts with staunch conservatives" and on ways
in which they could attack Rehnquist Court decision making. 98
"What we're trying to do," said Senator Schumer, "is set the

Something in Common with British Parliament, ROLL CALL, Jan. 29, 1996 (noting
that Gingrich "and other Republican leaders have·long impressed on their House
colleagues the need to think in terms of party ... .").
94. See Charles E. Schumer, Judging By Ideology, N.Y. TIMES, June 26,
2001, at A19 ("The Supreme Court's recent 5-4 decisions that constrain
Congressional power are probably the best evidence that the Court is dominated
by conservatives. . . . Tilting the Court further to the right would push our Court
sharply away from the core values held by most of our country's citizens.").
95. See Senator Charles Schumer and Jeff Sessions Discuss Whether
Personal Ideology Should Matter When Confirming Federal Judiciary Nominees,
NBC News: Meet the Press Transcripts, July 1, 2001, available at 2001 WL
24103448; Interview by Brit Hume with Senator Patrick Leahy, Fox News: Fox
News Sunday (July 29, 2001) (transcript on file with the University of Colorado
Law Review).
96. See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. S1671-02, S1672 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2001)
(statement of Sen. Leahy) ("The reality today in courts such as the U.S. Supreme
Court and Fourth Circuit that are dominated by ideologically conservative
Republican appointees is that the dominant flavor of judicial activism is right
wing.").
97. See generally, e.g., Should Ideology Matter? Judicial Nominations 2001:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the Senate
Comm.
on
the
Judiciary
(June
26,
2001),
available
at
http://www .senate .gov/ -judiciary/oldsitelhr06260 1sc.htm.
98. Neil A. Lewis, Washington Talk: Democrats Readying for Judicial Fight,
N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2001, at A19.
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stage and make sure that both the White House and the Senate
Republicans know [what] we expect."99
Polarization. Judicial confirmation fights are inevitable
byproducts of the fact that the Senate is more polarized today
than at any time since the late nineteenth century. Unlike the
1960s and 1970s, when liberal (Rockefeller) Republicans and
conservative (Dixiecrat) Democrats resulted in roughly similar
ideological positions in both parties, ideology and party sharply
divide today's Senate. 100 A plotting of the ideological positions
of lawmakers would reveal that all Republican coordinates
would fall on the right and all Democratic coordinates would
fall on the left. 101 One result of this transformation is the
demise of old Senate folkways, including the norms of
institutional respect and civility .toward members of the other
party. 102 With less emphasis placed on working in a bipartisan
way to get things done, attention instead has shifted to
blocking what the other side wants. 103 In such an atmosphere,
gridlock over the pace of the confirmation process is to be
expected-so much so that ever-widening party divisions often
take priority over a nominee's qualifications. 104
Indeed,
"[q]uantitative studies suggest that ideological polarization in
the Senate may be more significant than divided government
itself in obstructing presidential nominations, though the effect
is magnified when different parties control the Senate and the
White House."105 As such, the effect of the Jeffords switch is to
99. Id. (quoting Sen. Charles Schumer).
100. See David E. Rosenbaum, In With the Ideologues, On With Deadlock,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1996, at 4-5.
101. See id. And with increasing polarization, of course, the parties are
more homogeneous.
This, of course, helps explain why Democrats and
Republicans are able to pursue unifying messages that will define their party.
See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
102. For a useful summary, see Brannon P. Denning, Reforming the New
Confirmation Process: Replacing "Despise and Resent" with "Advice and Consent,"
53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 15-17 (2001) (discussing, among other works, DONALD R.
MATIHEWS, U.S. SENATORS AND THEIR WORLD 94--117 (1960)).
103. For a related argument, see BARBARA SINCLAIR, THE TRANSFORMATION
OF THE U.S. SENATE, 71-101 (1989) (explaining why Senators no longer embrace
the "reciprocity norm").
104. See generally MICHAEL J . GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS
PROCESS (2000); G. Calvin MacKenzie, Starting Over: The Presidential
Appointment Process in 1997 (1998), available at The Century Foundation
http://www.tcf.orgfl'ask_Forces/Nominations/MacKenzie/ (last visited May 20,
2002).
105. Keith E. Whittington, The Confirmation Process We Deserve, POL'y R.,
June & July 2001, at 76, 82. For one recent quantitative study, see Keith T. Poole
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bolster already existing Democratic opposition to the
appointment of political conservatives .. · It is little wonder then
that Senate Democrats have seized upon the Rehnquist Court's
increasing willingness to strike down civil rights laws on
federalism grounds. By suggesting that the Court is now
engaging in "conservative judicial activism," Senate Democrats
have found a high sounding principle to back up their demand
that the President's judicial nominees be less conservative than
either the President or their Republican counterparts in the
Senate.
Power. With Republicans controlling the House and the
White House, the confirmation process is one of the few places
where Democrats hold the trump card. In other words, since
this is their "show," they have real incentives to exercise the
limited power they have. 106 Furthermore, if Democrats did not
use their confirmation power, especially in light of party
polarization, they would appear little more than a rubber
stamp for the Republican agenda. 107
Saliency of the Courts. Court decisions are consequential
and, as such, the party who does not control the White House
always has incentives to limit the power of the President. For
this very reason, Republicans worked hard to limit President
Clinton's power to appoint judges. 108
Likewise, Senate
Democrats want to throw as many obstacles as they can in
front of the Bush White House. That way the "bad guys" will
get fewer judgeships and, perhaps more important, the

& Howard Rosenthal, D-Nominate After 10 Years: A Comparative Update to
Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll-Call Voting, 26 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 5
(2001), available at http://www.voteview.uh.edu/praps99.pdf ("We find that the
trend to polarization and unidimensionality that we identified in Congress has
continued unabated through the 105th Congress.").
106. Relatedly, Democrats may use their confirmation power to pursue a
broad range of political objectives. For example, the Senate may hold up a
confirmation hearing in order to secure the President's signature on a piece of
legislation or a modification of executive branch policy. During the Clinton years,
for example, the Senate Republicans held back the confirmation of Lois Schiffer,
Clinton's choice to head the Justice Department's Environment Division, in order
to secure a change in Justice Department policy on environmental crimes. See
Neal Devins, Congressional-Executive Information Access Disputes: A Modest
Proposal-Do Nothing, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 109, 124 (1996).
107. By analogy, Charles Black has written that the Supreme Court must,
on occasion, invalidate a law in order to retain its status as an independent
branch of government. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 8788 (1960).
108. See infra notes 112, 120-121 and accompanying text.
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President may be forced to moderate his appointments so that
President Bush will not appoint committed conservatives to the
bench, especially to the Supreme Court and to appellate court
judgeships that may later set the stage for a Supreme Court
appointment. 109 Along these lines, Senate Democrat attacks
against "conservative judicial activism" tell the Bush White
House that the cost of appointing conservative judicial
nominees is quite high.
Much of the above analysis, of course, calls attention to
ways in which lawmakers see court decisions as politically
salient. At the risk of redundancy, three recent examples
illustrating the saliency of the courts to both Democrats and
Republicans. First, over the objections of Senators Leahy and
Schumer, the Bush White House limited the American Bar
Association's role in judicial appointments by refusing to give
the ABA a chance to rate nominees before their names were
sent to the Senate. 110 This action fortified a Republican-led
campaign to limit the ABA, whose evaluations had been
attacked by conservatives for their "liberal bias."111
In
particular, when chairing the Judiciary Committee, Orrin
Hatch refused to include ABA assessments as an official part of
committee deliberations. 112 After the Jeffords switch, Senate
Democrats reversed Hatch's decision. 113 Second, before the
Jeffords switch, Senate Republicans limited the power of
Senators to "blue slip" Bush nominees from their home state. 114
Rather than require the support of both home state senators
before taking action on a nominee, Hatch sought to limit the

109. For this very reason, Democrats have targeted, among others, Jeffrey
Sutton (appointed to the Sixth Circuit) and Miguel Estrada (appointed to the D.C.
Circuit). See also infra note 123 (discussing Senate Judiciary Committee rejection
of Charles Pickering).
110. See Amy Goldstein, Bush Curtails ABA Role in Selecting U.S. Judges,
WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 2001, at Al.
111. See Elisabeth Frater, Revenge of the Bork Conservatives, 33 NAT'L J .
970 (2001).
112. See Goldstein, supra note 110.
113. Judicial Nominations: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/member_statement.cfm?id=181&wit_id=50.
114. The "blue slip" is a procedure in which the chair of the Senate Judiciary
Committee asks the Senators of the nominee's home state whether they support
the nominee. For a history of the "blue slip," see Brannon P. Denning, The "Blue
Slip": Enforcing the Norms of the Judicial Confirmation Process, 10 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 75 (2001).
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"blue slip" to nominees opposed by both home state Senators. 115
In protest, Senate Democrats delayed the confirmation of nowSolicitor General Ted Olson by walking out of a Judiciary
Committee meeting. 116 After the Jeffords switch, of course,
Senate Democrats returned to the preexisting practice. 117
Third, in· .an effort to pressure Senate Democrats to move
quickly on Bush judicial nominees, Republicans delayed the
vote on the foreign operations appropriations bill for 2002 (a
highly visible bill tied to the war on terrorism). 118
Pay Back. With comity among Senators taking a back seat
to the ever-increasing polarization of Democrats and
Republicans and the desire of each party to send a message
distinguishing itself from the other, 119 it is little wonder that
each party can file a bill of grievances against the other.
Senate Democrats have a strong desire to pay the Republicans
back for their management of the confirmation process during
the Clinton years. At that time, Democrats complained loudly
about Republican refusals to confirm nominees, Republican
delays in confirming nominees, Republican success in logrolling
Republican-preferred candidates in exchange for their
confirming Clinton nominees, and by Republican claims that
there were too many judges (so that the seat should have been
lost, not replaced by a Clinton appointee). 120 And if that were
115. See id. at 83-84.
116. See Glen Johnson, Democrats' Walkout Signals Partisan Rupture Ouer
Judges, BOSTON GLOBE, May 4, 2001, at A6.
117. See Helen Dewar, Senate Reorganization Finalized, Democrats Pledge
to Follow Tradition on Court Nominees, WASH. POST, June 30, 2001, at All; Dave
Boyer, Senate Concurs on Reorganization, GOP Fails to Win Pledge on Judges,
WASH. TIMES, June 30, 2001, at A4.
118. See Neil A. Lewis, Democrats Are Pushed on Judicial Nominees, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 21, 2001, at A22; AI Kamen, Pressing the Issue of Judicial
Confirmations, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 2001, at A21 (noting Republican effort to
craft the following message: "You can't get wire taps, search warrants, etc.
without judges; confirm the President's slate so that efforts to capture terrorists
won't be delayed.").
119. See supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text (message politics); supra
notes 92-96 and accompanying text (polarization).
120. On the refusal to confirm, see Gerhardt, supra note 104, at 140-143;
John Podesta & Beth Nolan, Federal Judgeships on Ice, WASH. POST, July 11,
2001, at A19. On delays in confirming, see John H . Cushman, Jr., Senate Imperils
Judicial System, Rehnquist Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1998, at AI (noting
Rehnquist's depiction of the Senate's failure to confirm judicial nominees as
threatening to "erod[e] the quality of justice"). On logrolling, see Gerhardt, supra
note 104, at 140-41 (describing how Republicans held judgeships hostage in an
effort both to force Clinton to nominate Ted Stewart, a nominee embraced by
Orrin Hatch, and to pressure Betty Fletcher, a sitting Ninth Circuit judge and
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not enough, Democrats were enraged by Republican efforts to
capitalize on George W. Bush's White House victory, including
the limiting of both the ABA's role and "blue slip" holds,
enraged Democrats.l21
That Democrats would respond in kind is hardly a
surprise. 122 And charges of "conservative judicial activism"
facilitate these efforts. 123 In particular, these charges create an
occasion for Democrats: (1) to delay the scheduling of
confirmation hearings, so that they can first explore the
Senate's role in curbing Rehnquist Court "activism"; (2) to be
more scrutinizing when they do hold hearings, so as to make
sure nominees do not exacerbate these activist tendencies; and
(3) to refuse to act on "activist" Bush nominees. Making the
invocation of conservative judicial activism even more
appealing, Senate Democrats can throw a label at Republicans
mother of Clinton nominee William Fletcher, to resign on nepotism grounds). On
Republican claims that there were too many judges, see Gerhardt, supra note 104,
at 187 (discussing Jesse Helms's objection to James Beatty, a Clinton nominee to
the Fourth Circuit).
121. See supra notes 110-115 and accompanying text.
122. For example, the Bush White House cut a deal with California's two
Democratic senators, Barbara Boxer and Diane Feinstein, over judicial
nominations in that state. Under the deal, a bipartisan advisory committee
(composed of Republican and Democratic appointees) will forward the names of
possible nominees to the White House. See Henry Weinstein, Process of Judge
Selection Set Up, L.A. TIMES, May 30, 2001, at 2-1. More striking, only 28 of the
80 judges nominated by President Bush in 2001 were confirmed by the Senate in
2001 (with no hearings scheduled for most of Bush's picks to the federal courts of
appeal). See David G. Savage, Bush's Judicial Nominees Go 28 for 80 in the
Senate, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2001, at A12. During this same period, successful
Bush nominees took (on average) 112 days from nomination to confirmation.
Lloyd Cutler & Mickey Edwards, End the Judicial Blame Game, WASH. POST,
Mar. 13, 2002, at A29. The average in the first year of Clinton's first term was
fifty-two days; the average in the first year of his second term was 133 days. Id.
123. Consider, for example, the Senate Judiciary Committee's Mar. 14, 2002
rejection of Bush appellate court nominee Charles Pickering. Senator Charles
Schumer, in explaining his opposition to Pickering, embraced the "conservative
judicial activism" mantra. Speaking of the need to maintain "balance on federal
courts" and of his fear that Bush wanted to "stack the courts with Scalias and
Thomases," Schumer found Pickering unacceptable. Neil A. Lewis, Panel Rejects
Bush Nominee for Judgeship, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2002, at Al. Other Senate
Democrats made clear that their Pickering vote, in part, was pay-back for
Republican resistance to Clinton judicial appointees. Senators Russell Feingold
CD-Wisc.) and Richard Durbin (D-Ill.) noted that Clinton's failure to get the
Republican Senate Judiciary Committee to confirm nominees to the Fifth Circuit
contributed to their decision to reject Bush's nomination of Pickering to the Fifth
Circuit. See 148 CONG. REC. S1915, S1918 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 2002) (remarks of
Sen. Durbin); David G. Savage, Senate Panel Rejects Bush's Judge Nominee, L.A.
TIMES, March 15, 2002, at A12 (quoting Sen. Feingold).
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that Republicans have long used to bolster their efforts to
reshape the judiciary.
Democrats also want to pay Republicans back for Bush v.
Gore, a decision that many (especially academics) condemned
as unprincipled judicial activism. 124 Bush v. Gore, however,
cannot be the focal point of confirmation hearings. It is too
much about Democrats versus Republicans and there is too
great a risk that a fight over Bush v. Gore will not help
Democrats build public support for their campaign to limit the
Bush White House.
Moreover, notwithstanding its
significance, it is just one case and a highly unusual, factspecific one at that. Rehnquist Court federalism decisions, in
contrast, can be pitched at a higher level of generality: It is not
simply about pure politics, but about civil and individual rights
versus decentralization in government. 125
CONCLUSION

Senate Democrats have good reason to target the
Rehnquist Court's federalism revival. With George W. Bush in
the White House, Democrats have strong incentives to limit
Bush administration efforts to select judges whose ideology is
in step with the Republican party. And since Rehnquist Court
federalism decisions can be packaged as both activist and a
threat to civil and individual rights, Senate Democrats are
using the confirmation process to attack "conservative judicial
activism." In contrast, Senate Democrats have little reason to
attack the individual decisions of the Rehnquist Court. Unlike
Court-curbing periods, these decisions do not pit Democrats
against Republicans. The bills that the Court invalidated
cannot be characterized as Democratic measures and, as such,
Democratic complaints against the Rehnquist Court cannot be
tied to changing alignments of power in the now Democratic
Senate. More significantly, when responding to the Court's

124. Five hundred eighty-five law professors, for example, signed onto a
January 13, 2001 New York Times advertisement, declaring that the justices in
the Bush v. Gore majority were "acting as political proponents for candidate Bush,
not as judges." See also Bruce Ackerman, The Court Packs Itself, THE AMERICAN
PROSPECT, Feb. 12, 2001, at 48 (arguing that the decision casts the Court's
fundamental legitimacy into question, so much so that the Senate should refuse to
confirm any Bush appointee to the Supreme Court).
125. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text (discussing how
federalism cases can be packaged).
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federalism-based decisions, Congress has little incentive to
attack the Court. At least until now, these decisions have been
quite minimalist-rarely invali.d ating all of the federal iaw and
never denying Congress or the states an opportunity to return
to the issue. Consequently, rather than target the Court,
Congress's incentives cut in favor of doing nothing or
responding to the ruling through new legislation. And while
the Rehnquist Court could extend its rulings in ways that limit
core legislative powers, the current round of compl~ints against
the Court has little to do with the Court's federalism decisions.
The fight over "conservative judicial activism" does not
stem from Democratic disappointment with the individual
decisions of the Rehnquist Court. 126 Instead, it is tied to the
increasing polarization within Congress, the related desire of
Senate Democrats both . to exercise power and pay the
Republicans back for their treatment of Clinton-era nominees,
the rise of message politics, and the saliency of the courts.
Having strong incentives to use the confirmation power as a
way of limiting presidential power, Senate Democrats needed a
label that would hold their party together and appeal to their
constituent base. "Conservative judicial activism" is that label.

126. This is not to say that Democrats approve of these decisions. Instead,
for reasons already specified, Democrats have little reason to attack the Court for
any ofthese decisions.

